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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLU.S.IONS 1
A. Issues
Rule 6(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the Special Court for Sierra Leone
allows amendments to the Rules, unless otherwise indicated, to take effect immediately. This is
a departure from the rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, both of which include the provision that the
amendments “shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case.” This
memo examines two issues raised by the immediate, or retroactive, application of amendments to
pending cases. First, Part III examines what rights are guaranteed the accused under the Statute
of the Special Court and whether the retroactive application of amendments would violate them.
Second, Part IV addresses whether a rule that is amended to deal with a specific problem arising
in a case would violate a defendant’s rights on the basis that it is ad hominem.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Applying an Amended Rule Retroactively to a Case Currently Pending Could
Result in a Violation of the Rights of the Accused, but It Is Not Per Se a
Violation.
The rights guaranteed the accused in the SCSL Statute are essentially the same as those
guaranteed under customary international law. Of primary concern here are: (1) the principle
that all are equal before the law; (2) the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay; (3)
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege; and (4) the right to have adequate time and resources to
1

Rule 6(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides that an
amendment to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, “unless otherwise indicated, shall enter into force
immediately.” Thus, the general principle at the Special Court for Sierra Leone is that where the Rules are amended
part way through a case, the amended rule will immediately apply to the remainder of the proceedings in the case.
1. Are there circumstances in which it would be contrary to the rights of the accused to apply an
amendment to the Rules in a case that is already pending at the time of the amendment? (See, in particular,
the rights of the accused in Article 17 of the Statute of the Special Court.)
2. In particular, if the Rules are amended for the specific purpose of dealing with a problem that has arisen
in a particular case, could the amendment be argued to be contrary to the rights of the accused in that case,
on the basis that it is “ad hominem”?
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prepare a defense. Prohibitions against retroactive rules of procedure and evidence are not
guaranteed rights. The right most likely to be violated by Rule 6(D) is the right to a fair trial.
There are some circumstances in which applying an amended rule to currently pending cases
does prevent a fair trial, but this is not always the case. In deciding which amendments should
be applied retroactively, judges can and strike a balance between the needs of the Special Court
and the potential for violations.
2. A Claim That the Immediate Application of an Amendment to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence to a Pending Case Violates the Defendant’s Rights on
the Basis of Ad Hominem Would Likely Not Succeed.
An ad hominem attack is one which attacks the speaker rather than his or her arguments.
In order for a personal attack to be ad hominem, the purpose of the attack must be to undermine
the person’s arguments or conclusions by discrediting the person. In adherence to international
norms and concern for the integrity and effectiveness of the Special Court, the SCSL Statute and
Rules provide many protections for the rights of the accused. These protections include, inter
alia, explicit declarations of a defendant’s rights, standards for court officials, and access for the
Principal Defender to the amendment process.

Due to the difficulty in proving that an

amendment was intentionally designed as a personal attack to undermine a person’s arguments,
and to the multiple layers of protections built into the Special Court, it is not likely that such a
claim would be successful.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“the Special Court”) was created by agreement
between the United Nations (U.N.) and the government of Sierra Leone in order to prosecute
persons bearing the greatest responsibility for the atrocities committed during Sierra Leone’s

9

civil war. 2 The civil war began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by
Foday Sankoh, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. 3 The first of several ceasefire agreements
was signed in Abidjan on November 30, 1996, and was supposed to end the conflict through
disarmament and integration of the RUF into the political process. 4
The Abidjan Peace Agreement collapsed in April 1997 when a military coup led by
Johnny Paul Koroma and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew President
Kabbah. The AFRC later joined forces with the RUF, but a third group, the Civil Defense Force
(CDF) led by Sam Hinga Norman, was formed to fight the RUF. In February 1998, the
Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) forced the
junta from the capital, but fighting continued throughout the country. 5
On July 7, 1999, the second major ceasefire, the Lomé Peace Agreement, was signed
between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. This agreement called for the following:
an end to the fighting; integration of the RUF into the government; a broad amnesty, 6
specifically mentioning Foday Sankoh but applying to to all members and ex-members of the
RUF, AFRC, CDF, and the Army of Sierra Leone (SLA); and a U.N. mission to aid with the
disarmament. 7 This agreement broke down in May 2000 when members of the RUF attacked

2

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone, January 16, 2002 [hereinafter “the Special Court Agreement.” Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
3
Rupert Skilbeck, Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Essex Human
Rights Review Vol. 1 No. 1, 66, 67 (2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51.]
4
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) (“Abidjan Peace Agreement”), November 30, 1996. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 23.]
5
Skilbeck supra note 3, at 67. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51.]
6
When signing the agreement, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General appended a reservation, holding
that the U.N. understood the amnesty provisions did not apply to “international crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR,
4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]
7
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
(“Lomé Peace Agreement”), July 7, 1999. [Hereinafter the “Lomé Peace Agreement.” Reproduced in
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and took hostage members of the U.N. peacekeeping force. Following the arrest of Sankoh and
the rescue of U.N. hostages, a final peace agreement was signed in Abuja on November 10,
2000. This time, the U.N. mission sent to aid in the disarmament and implementation of the
peace agreement, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (U.N.AMSIL), was
composed of over 17,000 personnel, and in January 2002, President Kabbah was able to declare
the civil war over. 8
At the request of President Kabbah 9 and pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution
1315 (2000) 10 the government of Sierra Leone and the U.N. negotiated the creation of an
independent Special Court which would prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for
the violations of both international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean domestic law from the
breakdown of the Abidjan Peace Agreement in 1996 until the signing of the Special Court
Agreement in January 2002. 11 Under the Special Court Agreement, the independent Special
Court was created by the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 12
For the issues addressed in this memo, two of the SCSL Statute’s articles deserve special
attention. Article 14, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopts the rules of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the caveat that the Rules may be amended by the
Special Court where they do not adequately provide for specific situations facing the Special
Court. In making amendments, the Special Court may be guided by Sierra Leone’s Criminal
Procedure Act of 1965. 13 While the Special Court shares many of the characteristics of other

accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
8
Skilbeck supra note 3, at 68. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51.]
9
Id.
10
S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]
11
Special Court Agreement, supra note 2 art. 1(1). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
12
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter “SCSL Statute”]. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 21.]
13
SCSL Statute, supra note 12, at art. 14. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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international tribunals, the U.N. “deliberately chose to establish a Special Court on a different
model to existing tribunals.” 14 Since the Special Court’s creation, the judges have unanimously
agreed in plenary session that the ICTR rules did not adequately provide for the “principle of fair
and expeditious justice.” 15
At issue here is Rule 6, Amendment to the Rules, which differs from the ICTR rules in
that, unless otherwise indicated, changes to the rules enter into force immediately. 16 Neither the
ICTR nor the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) allows amendments to the
rules to apply to cases pending at the time the change is made. Rule 6(C) of the ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence reads: “An amendment shall enter into force immediately, but shall not
operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case.” 17 Amendments to the ICTY
Rules for Procedure and Evidence take effect seven days after the official date of issue, but as in
the ICTR, “shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused or of a convicted or acquitted
person in any pending case.” 18
Article 17 of the SCSL Statute defines the minimum guaranteed rights of the accused.
Four sections or subsections are relevant to the issues at hand. Section 1 states that “[a]ll
accused shall be equal before the Special Court.” Section 2 guarantees a fair and public hearing,
subject to special considerations for the protection of witnesses. Subsections 4(b) and (c)

14

Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Prosecutor, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Case
No. SCSL-2003-07-PT, and Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2003-09-PT, Decision on the
Applications for a Stay of Proceedings and Denial of Right to Appeal, November 4, 2003, para. 10. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]
15
Id. at para. 28.
16
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended at the 6th Plenary May 14, 2005 [hereinafter “Rules.” Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
17
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted June 29, 1995, amended June 7, 2005. Rule 6(C). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
18
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 36, adopted February 11, 1994, amended December 30,
2000. Rule 6(D). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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provide for “adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [the accused’s] defence and to be
tried without delay.” 19
III. RULE 6(D) AND RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
In order to analyze the impact of a Rule 6(D) amendment, three things must be
determined: first, what rights the accused actually has; second, whether there are circumstances
where those rights could be abused; and third, what approaches the Special Court can take to
limit the possibility of abuse.
A. What are the rights of the accused?
The rights of the accused are founded primarily in two sources: the SCSL Statute and
international law. While the Special Court may look to Sierra Leonean law for guidance,
particularly in regard to offences relating to the abuse of girls or wanton destruction of
property, 20 the Special Court is not bound by that authority.
1. SCSL Statute
The fundamental rights of the accused are found in Article 17 of the SCSL Statute. In
considering the impact of an amendment to the Rules under Rule 6(D), four sections or
subsections are the most relevant. These sections are as follows:
1. All accused shall be equal before the Special Court.
2. The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special
Court for the protection of victims and witnesses. . . .
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Stature, he or she shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality . . .
4(b). To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence and to communicate
with counsel of his or her own choosing;
4(c). To be tried without undue delay. 21

19

SCSL Statute, supra note 12, at art. 17. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
Article 5 of the SCSL Statute allows the Special Court to prosecute people who have allegedly committed certain
offences under Sierra Leonean law rather than international law. These include abusing a girl 14 years of age or
younger and abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, which are contrary to the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Act, 1926, and setting fire to a dwelling, public building or other buildings under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861.
Id. at art. 5.
21
Id. at art. 17 §§ 1, 2, 4(b) and (c).
20
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Other rights are built into the SCSL Statute 22 and the Rules, 23 but Article 17 provides the
framework against which potential violations of the rights of the accused may be analyzed.
2. International Law
The Special Court’s foundation in international law also provides the accused with
clearly identifiable rights. The Special Court was created by agreement between the U.N. and
the government of Sierra Leone and meets the criteria for a treaty set forth in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations (“the 1986
Vienna Convention”). 24 Also, with the exception of the violations of the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children Act and the Malicious Damage Act, the crimes which the Special Court was created
to prosecute are “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.” 25 Because of its existence as an international tribunal and the
nature of the crimes it was created to prosecute, the Special Court operates according to
international standards, meaning “it must have the mechanisms and facilities to dispense evenhanded justice, providing at the same time all the guarantees of fairness and it must be in tune
with international human rights instruments.” 26
a. Treaty-Based Norms for the Rights of the Accused

22

See for example SCSL Statute, supra note 12, at art. 13, requirement that judges be of high moral character,
impartiality and integrity, and art. 20, the right to appeal convictions. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 21.]
23
See for example Rules, supra note 16, at Rule 39: Conduct of Investigations, Rule 42: Rights of Suspects During
Investigation, and Rule 45: Defence Office, creating a dedicated body to ensure the rights of suspects and the
accused. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
24
Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14AR72(E), and Brima Bazzy Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of
Jurisdiction, March 13, 2004, at paras. 42 and 43. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
25
Id. at para. 40.
26
Id. at para. 55.
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The international community has developed through an array of treaties a widely held set
of basic rights for those accused of crimes, whether the crimes are of international or domestic
character. These rights include, inter alia, equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest
or detention, reasonable time and facilities to prepare a defense, a fair and public trial within a
reasonable amount of time, an impartial and independent tribunal, and the principles of nullum
crimen sine lege, or no ex post facto laws. 27
The prohibition on retroactivity based on the principles of nullum crimen sine lege
applies only to the crimes for which a person is being charged, not changes to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, however,
clearly states in Article 51 that amendments to the rules “shall not be applied retroactively to the
detriment of the person who is being investigated or prosecuted or who has been convicted.” 28
Although Sierra Leone has ratified the Rome Statute, 29 there are two reasons why the ICC’s
prohibition of retroactivity cannot apply to the Special Court. First, under Article 11 of the
Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction only over crimes committed after its entry into force. 30
Since the statute did not enter into force until July 1, 2002, its provisions could not apply to any
of the crimes the Special Court was created to prosecute. Second, and perhaps more important,

27

African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), art. 3 and 7, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8 and 9, November
22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (CFREU), art. 20, 47 and 49, December 18, 2000 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
4]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECPHRFF), art. 6 and 7,
November 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, 14 and 15, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 12]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”), art. 22 and 67, July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17]; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), art. 6-11, December 10, 1948, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948), [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
28
Rome Statute, supra note 27, at art. 51(4). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
29
Sierra Leone signed the Rome Statute on October 17, 1998 and ratified it September 15, 2000; see
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
30
Rome Statute, supra note 27, at art. 11(1). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
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the provisions of the Rome Statute only apply to cases before the ICC. While most of the crimes
alleged in the cases before the Special Court would but for the time element fall under the
jurisdiction of the ICC, 31 the ICC’s jurisdiction is not mandatory. That court may exercise its
jurisdiction only when an Article 5 crime has been alleged and that crime is referred to the
Prosecutor by a State Party or the U.N. Security Council, or an investigation is initiated by the
Prosecutor. 32 As a signatory to the Rome Statute, the government of Sierra Leone has the
discretion of trying these crimes itself, referring the cases to the ICC (although as was discussed
above, that is not possible in this case due to the timing issue), or coming up with an alternative
solution that still meets international standards. In this case, Sierra Leone chose the third option
by entering into an agreement with the U.N.
What this means in terms of the SCSL is that the Special Court has the power to
determine what rights the accused have within the framework of the SCSL Statute and the Rules,
and whether those rights have been violated. The Special Court’s options if it determines that a
right has been violated are discussed below. While the rights of the accused enumerated in
Article 17 of the SCSL Statute may be less expansive than in some international agreements, 33
they clearly fall within the standards of the Special Court’s binding treaty obligations. In other
words, nothing in the above mentioned treaties as applied to the Special Court per se prohibits
the immediate application of amendments to the Rules.
31
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b. Customary International Law
The International Law Association defines customary international law as a rule “which
is created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other subjects of
international law . . . in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar
conduct in the future.” 34 Over the last century, many of the rights of the accused have become
customary international law. The right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable amount of
time, the presumption of innocence, nullum crimen sine lege, and adequate time to prepare a
defense are all found in just about every international agreement on human rights, 35 and it is
reasonable to expect that will be the case for decades to come.
International criminal tribunals, however, are still a relatively new phenomenon going
back only sixty years, and their processes are still being refined. The Special Court for Sierra
Leone is an example of that.

Unlike earlier tribunals, the Special Court is treaty-based,

independent from the U.N. Security Council. 36 It is prosecuting a combination of international
and domestic crimes, 37 and is made up of a mix of Sierra Leonean and foreign judges. 38 Also,
the Rules created the Defence Office to ensure the rights of suspects and the accused, 39 an
innovation for international tribunals resulting from criticisms that other tribunals had failed to
provide adequate defense representation. 40 The result of this experimentation is that while the
minimum human rights guarantees are set in stone, the procedures or mechanisms of how to
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protect those rights remain flexible. The right to a fair trial is thus immutable; the procedures
used in that trial are not.
3. Sierra Leone’s Laws
A part of the hybrid nature of the Special Court is that it is responsible for prosecuting
violations of international humanitarian law as well as certain offences under Sierra Leonean
law. 41 The SCSL Statute also indicates that in carrying out its various functions, the Special
Court may be influenced by Sierra Leone’s laws. Article 14(2) states the Special Court “may be
guided . . . by the Criminal Procedure Act, 1965” when amending the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. 42 In the appellate process, the Special Court is directed to be guided by the ICTY and
ICTR on international matters, but to be “guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra
Leone” when interpreting and applying the laws of Sierra Leone. 43
Two very important conclusions can be drawn from these statutory provisions. First, the
Special Court is not bound in any way by Sierra Leonean law when interpreting an international
issue. Article 14 adopts the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence with the understanding that,
where they are not appropriate for Sierra Leone’s situation or legal traditions, they should be
changed. When amending the Rules, the Special Court may be guided by Sierra Leone’s laws,
but it is not required to do so. This issue was indirectly addressed in the Appeals Chamber’s
Decision on challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty. 44 The issue there was whether
the Special Court was bound by the Amnesty provision of the Lomé Accord between the
government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. Article 9 of the Lomé Accord stated that the
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government would take steps to provide Foday Sankoh an absolute and free pardon, granted a
blanket amnesty to members of the various warring factions for acts done in support of that
faction, and ensured no official or judicial action would be taken. 45 The Special Court held that
the Lomé Accord was not a treaty or agreement in the nature of a treaty; that whatever
obligations it created were regulated by the domestic laws of Sierra Leone; and that as a result, it
did not have any effect on the Special Court. 46
The second important conclusion to be drawn from the SCSL Statute is that while the
Special Court is to be guided by Sierra Leonean law regarding Article 5 crimes, it is not bound
by Sierra Leone’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Article 5 grants the Special Court the
power to prosecute crimes relating to the abuse of girls under Sierra Leone’s Prevention of
Cruelty to Children Act, 1926, and those relating to arson under the Malicious Damage Act,
1861. 47 While Article 14 allows the Special Court to be guided by Sierra Leone’s Criminal
Procedure Act, 1965, when amending the Rules, 48 Article 20, Appellate Proceedings, is more
explicit. It states that when interpreting and applying the laws of Sierra Leone, the Appeals
Chamber “shall be guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.” 49 Thus,
when deciding substantive issues of law regarding the abuse of girls or arson, such as whether
the elements of a crime have been proven, the Special Court would look to Sierra Leonean
precedent rather than the ICTY or ICTR. The Special Court would not have to defer to Sierra
Leone’s Rules of Procedure since they are derived from the Criminal Procedure Act, which is not
covered by the SCSL Statute.
45
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B. Are There Circumstances Where Rule 6(D) Would Violate Rights?
Having determined which rights the accused are entitled to, it is now necessary to discuss
whether there are circumstances in which an amendment under Rule 6(D) would violate the
rights of the accused. This section will discuss the procedure for amending the Rules, the
primary concerns with retroactively applying an amendment, an example of how an amendment
might violate the defendant’s rights, and how the Special Court has addressed this issue.
1. Procedure for Amendment
Rule 6 of the Special Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows for the immediate
implementation of changes to those rules. Amendment proposals may be made by a Judge of
either the Trial or Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor, the Registrar, the Principle Defender, the
Sierra Leone Bar Association, or any other entity invited by the President of the Special Court to
propose amendments. Proposals may be adopted either at a Plenary Meeting of the Special
Court, or provided that the Judges approve the amendment unanimously. Unless the Judges
decide otherwise, the amendment will take effect immediately and be published by the
Registrar. 50 The Rules have been amended six times since the Special Court was established. 51
2. Concerns With Retroactive Application
As the SCSL Statute and the agreements on human rights discussed above make clear,
one of the highest concerns is that the accused are afforded a fair trial. All of the other rights,
whether that the trial be public or timely, that the tribunal be impartial, or that the defendant be
allowed the proper resources to defend himself of herself, are simply ways of guaranteeing a fair
trial. Another major concern is that a person’s actions are not criminalized after they are
committed. It is from these two perspectives that Rule 6(D) will be analyzed.
50
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a. Fair Trial
Whenever a rule is changed, there is likely to be a party who is advantaged or
disadvantaged by that rule. However, a disadvantage may be so slight as to be insignificant, or
the harm done by allowing the rule to remain in place may be so great that justice would not be
served. Many of the protections guaranteeing a fair trial are found in the Rules, not the SCSL
Statute or Special Court Agreement. For example, the framers of the Special Court Agreement
and SCSL Statute have been criticized for their early neglect of adequate defense
representation. 52

The only mention of the defense in the Special Court Agreement is the

provisions in Article 14, which discusses defendant’s counsel’s rights. 53 The SCSL Statute goes
further by positively stating the rights of the accused in Article 17, particularly the right to have
counsel appointed if the defendant can not provide his own, and establishing guidelines for the
selection of judges. The lack of provisions for an office of the defense, which in fact was the
status quo for international tribunals dating back to Nuremburg, was only rectified by the
creation of the Defence Office under Rule 45. The purpose of the Defence Office is to ensure
the rights of suspects and the accused. 54 In its November 2005 online publication “Justice in
Motion: The Trial Phase of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Watch stated
that the Defence Office continues “to serve a critical function in helping to protect the rights of
the accused, and represents an unprecedented and important innovation for international and
hybrid tribunals.” 55
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Because many of the rights of the accused are found in the Rules, and because there is no
explicit ban on retroactive application of an amendment to those Rules, there is the potential for
a violation of a defendant’s rights.
b. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Another major concern with the immediate application of amended rules is the principle
of nullum crimen sine lege, 56 which prohibits the retroactive punishment of someone whose acts
become criminalized after the fact. In Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara,
and Santigie Borbor Kanu, the Special Court addressed this issue in relationship to the charges
brought against the defendants. There, the defense argued inter alia that the Indictment against
the Accused included charges of crimes against humanity, which were not part of Sierra Leone’s
domestic law when they were alleged to have occurred. Furthermore, the Indictment included
violations of Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, which Sierra Leone had acceded to but
had not fully incorporated into its own laws. Therefore, the defense argued, all of these charges
should be void. 57 The Special Court disagreed with the defense, noting that the Special Court
derives its existence exclusively from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315 and the Special
Court Agreement. 58 Since the Special Court is therefore an international body and not a part of
the judicial system of Sierra Leone, it is not bound by Sierra Leone’s laws. The acts for which
the accused were charged were already codified in international law prior to being committed,
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and it was these international laws that the SCSL Statute authorized the Special Court to
prosecute. Therefore, there was no issue of nullum crimen sine lege. 59
While the Special Court in Brima did not touch on the issue of retroactive application of
amendments to the Rules, the same analysis would apply when applied to Rule 6(D). The crimes
which the Special Court has the power to prosecute are listed in Articles 2-5 of the SCSL Statute.
As discussed above, those crimes are well established in international law. Rule 6(D) derives its
authority from Article 14(2) of the SCSL Statute, which states, “The judges of the Special Court
as a whole may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or adopt additional rules where the
applicable Rules do not, or do not adequately, provide for a specific situation.”60 However,
under Rule 6(D), Judges have the power to amend only the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, not
the SCSL Statute or Special Court Agreement, and certainly not the treaties defining crimes
against humanity. Therefore, in the context of a Rule 6(D) amendment, the issue of nullum
crimen sine lege cannot arise, as there is no change in the legality of the alleged acts. The
resulting change in procedures might work to the advantage or disadvantage of a defendant (as is
discussed below), but there is a violation of his rights only if it results in an unfair trial.
3. Example of Amending the Rules
The following hypothetical example illustrates the potential for a violation of the rights of
the accused. Rule 72(A) requires that preliminary motions “be brought within 21 days following
disclosure by the Prosecutor to the Defense of all material envisaged by Rule 66(A)(i).” It is
within the power of the Special Court to amend this Rule to require preliminary motions be
brought within ten days rather than twenty-one. The amended Rule could also be applied to all
cases, including those already before the court. If a defendant was already on the eleventh day of
59
60
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the twenty-one day window, the amended rule would prohibit him from filing any preliminary
motions. While the SCSL Statute does not specifically ban this retroactive application, it would
clearly violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Also, if another defendant facing similar
charges was only on the fifth day of the twenty-one day window, the guarantee that all are equal
before the Special Court would be violated.
4. Special Court For Sierra Leone’s Balancing Test
The Special Court has recognized that there are circumstances where the rights of the
accused could be threatened and that there needs to be some type of evaluation of those
circumstances. The Trial Chamber addressed this issue in its response to the defendants’ Motion
on Abuse of Process Due to Infringement of Principles of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and NonRetroactivity as to Several Counts in Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba, et al. 61 On this particular issue,
the defense challenged the indictments on the grounds that they amounted to an abuse of process.
The charges in the indictments, it was argued, violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
The Trial Chamber rejected the defendants’ arguments, in part because the crimes charged were
already established under international law, and discussed the issue of fairness in terms of the
abuse of process doctrine. Drawing on common law precedent and ICTY rulings, the Trial
Chamber laid out the standard of fairness the Special Court would adhere to. The Trial Chamber
quoted the Appeals Chamber, saying “[t]he fairness that is involved is not fairness in the process
of adjudication itself but fairness in the use of the machinery of justice.” 62 That is, the Special
Court is less concerned with a single fair adjudication than with ensuring the process itself is fair.
This sense of fairness will allow proceedings which have been lawfully initiated through issuing
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an indictment to be terminated if “improper or illegal proceedings” are employed. However, the
decision to terminate is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised when “proceeding with the
trial would contravene the court’s sense of justice.” 63 In making that decision, the Special Court
balances the nature and severity of the crimes alleged against the abuse of process, or unfairness,
that continuing the prosecution would engender. The violation would have to reach a certain
threshold, such that it undermined “the integrity of the proceedings,” to constitute an abuse of
process. 64
One problem with the process of amending the Rules is that the judges who decide
whether the retroactive application of an amended rule is fair are the same judges who amended
that rule. While the Principal Defender may propose amendments, only the judges have a say in
whether they are adopted. If the proposed amendment is adopted outside of a Plenary Meeting,
the decision must be unanimous, but otherwise just requires a majority. Therefore, it is possible
to have an objection to an amended rule being applied retroactively heard by judges who were
against adopting that amendment. However, since one of the main goals of the Special Court is
to provide “a credible system of justice and accountability” and “contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace,” 65 the appearance of
prejudice may be as damaging as actual prejudice.
A second, related, issue is the right to appeal amendments to the Rules. Because the
judges who adopted the amendment would be the same judges hearing the appeal, there is no
effective challenge to a decision to apply retroactively that amendment. In Prosecutor v. Sam
Hinga Norman, et al., the defendants challenged an amended rule that now allows “certain
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motions raising jurisdictional questions to be appealed, prior to trial, to the appeals chamber.” 66
They argued that the amendment violates the guaranteed human right of appeal since the Appeals
Chamber decides the preliminary motion.

The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument,

pointing out that the rights guaranteed by the SCSL Statute include the right to appeal
convictions, not every single decision prior to a conviction. 67 The decision also pointed out that
in the common law system, which Sierra Leone’s traditions are derived, jurisdictional questions
are sometimes heard in the first instance by the highest court, precluding the opportunity for
appeal. That was the position taken by the ICTY and the ICTR, and the Special Court has the
same power. 68 The Special Court would most likely answer any challenge to the retroactive
application of an amended rule on the grounds that there is no effective appeal from the decision
to apply the rule in a similar fashion. However, such a decision may still give the appearance of
unfairness, thus undermining the Special Court’s purpose, if it is based on the idea only a
violation of the defendant’s rights that is so egregious that it calls into question the legitimacy of
the Special Court would result in a favorable ruling for the defendant.
C. Alternate Approaches
Given that the overriding concern of the Special Court and of international law in this
context is to provide a fair trial, and that the immediate application of a Rule 6(D) amendment
has the potential to disadvantage the accused,69 the next logical question is how to determine
whether retroactivity would result in an unfair trial. This section discusses two alternative
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approaches based on the common law tradition dating back to 1801, which could answer the
criticisms of prejudice.
1. Schooner Peggy
The first authoritative case in which U.S. courts approached the issue of retroactively
applying a new rule to a pending case was United States v. Schooner Peggy. 70 In that case, the
U.S. seized an armed French vessel. While the owner’s appeal was pending at the Supreme
Court, the U.S. entered into a treaty with France. One provision of the treaty was the return of
French vessels seized as Peggy had been. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and
ordered the ship returned. 71

In his opinion for the Special Court, Chief Justice Marshall

explained that if “a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must
be obeyed, or its obligation denied. . . . the court must decide according to existing laws.” 72
While later courts would expand the scope of Peggy to include statutory changes lacking the
mandatory language of the treaty with France, that explicit command to apply the treaty
retroactively is one of the things that made the case stand out, 73 and it is why Peggy is relevant to
the issue at hand.
Like Marshall’s opinion in Peggy, the Special Court’s Rules explicitly make amendments
retroactively applicable to pending cases. Under the Peggy model, this is enough. The argument
would be that the Rules apply equally to everyone at the same time. While some defendants may
be disadvantaged by the outcome of a retroactive application, and others may benefit, the process
itself would be fair. Furthermore, the Rules are just one element in the process and other
considerations serve to protect the rights of the accused. For instance, the Principal Defender
70
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may propose amendments, which, if approved, would probably benefit defendants. Also, the
Rules may be changed only at a Plenary Meeting of the Special Court or by the unanimous
approval of all the Judges. 74
The Peggy model, however, is unlikely to be sustainable as a rationale for retroactively
applying amended rules. First, Peggy was decided long before international standards for the
rights of the accused were established.

The mere fact that the SCSL Statute allows for

retroactivity does not make it legitimate if doing so would violate customary and treaty-based
guarantees. Second, a statutory justification lacking a solid policy basis would not be likely to
satisfy critics of the Special Court, thus undermining its function of supporting peace and
reconciliation. Any change in the Rules which has the potential to prejudice a defendant’s case
must be accompanied by well reasoned legal and policy arguments in order to avoid the
appearance of an unfair trial. Third, because the Rules play such an important role in protecting
the rights of the accused, the argument that they are just one of several elements guaranteeing a
fair trial is unlikely to receive much credibility. The rights guaranteed by Article 17 of the SCSL
Statute would be empty words without the specific provisions provided by the Rules, and the
Special Court’s ability to change those Rules simply because the SCSL Statute authorized it too
would appear arbitrary and capricious.
2. Modern Common Law Approach
The modern trend is a strong preference against retroactivity, but with the understanding
that justice is not always served by a bright line rule. 75 A balancing test weighing several factors
can be applied to ensure that changes to the Rules are well reasoned and only applied where they
will not result in prejudice towards the defendant. The factors to be considered are: the purpose
74
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of the new rule, the element of surprise, and the effect the change will have on the court
system. 76
First, the Special Court should identify the purpose of the new rule. The court “should
determine whether on balance those purposes will be served by general retroactive application of
the new rule,” and then whether applying the rule retroactively to the case before it would
accomplish its purpose. 77 Unlike in the U.S., where courts make these determinations after the
rule has been changed, the Special Court should take these questions into account when deciding
whether to adopt the amendment. Rule 6(D) requires that the court indicate at the time they are
adopted which amendments do not take effect immediately. As discussed above, since the same
people who decide which changes are made are the same who rule on whether such changes are
fair, it is practically futile to challenge an amendment once it is adopted. On the other hand,
since more judges are involved in the amendment process than in ruling on legal issues, the
threat of personal bias affecting the decision is lessened. In the hypothetical example above
dealing with the timeframe for filing preliminary motions, the Special Court would first have to
determine why the change was necessary. If the reason for decreasing the time limit was that
defendants were using the twenty-one days as a means of slowing the proceedings down, an
immediate application of that change would be reasonable. However, if when looking at the
specific case before the Special Court it was apparent that the new time limit would already have
run, applying the new rule would serve no effective deterrent value and would in fact be contrary
to the defendant’s rights.
Next, the Special Court must consider the element of surprise. “Will a decision to make
the new rule retroactive defeat reasonable expectations and justified reliances that were based on
76
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the assumption of the continued existence of the old rule?” 78 In the case of the Special Court,
the factor of surprise works a little differently than in a traditional court setting. Under Rule
6(D), the issue is not which law was violated, but how to deal with the procedures. As discussed
above, the laws with which the accused are charged of violating have not changed. Where the
element of surprise does need to be taken into account, though, is with regard to the right to have
adequate time to prepare a defense. Again, using the above example, decreasing the time limit to
file preliminary motions in such a way that a defendant was prohibited from doings so as soon as
the new rule was applied would not only defeat the reasonable expectations created by the earlier
rule, it would also violate that defendant’s right to adequate time to prepare a defense. The
solution to this problem would not be difficult or cumbersome for the Special Court. Since the
Special Court has the discretion of not making the amendment immediately effective, in cases
where a retroactive application could be reasonably expected to violate a defendant’s right to a
fair trial, all the Special Court has to do is modify the date on which the amendment comes into
force. While a similar problem to that of the Special Court’s approach would still exist, i.e. that
an unfair application does not have an effective remedy, a reasoned opinion showing that the
Special Court has considered the possibility that a right could be in jeopardy and has found that
not to be the case would prevent the appearance of arbitrary and capricious decision making.
The final factor for the Special Court to consider under this model is the effect
retroactivity will have on the administration of the court system itself.79 The application of this
factor is different for U.S. courts and the Special Court, but the end result should be the same.
The basic principle is that if a retroactive application of a new rule is going to slow down the
judicial system, resulting in a greater likelihood across the board of miscarriages of justice, then
78
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the expected benefit of the new rule is less likely to be justified. In the case of the U.S. courts,
the concern is that the volume of cases a new rule creates could overwhelm the system. For
example, if following Mapp v. Ohio the U.S. courts were forced to rehear every criminal case in
which their conviction was obtained through illegally seized evidence, the result would be an
impossible burden placed on the court system. 80 The Special Court’s motive in dealing with the
amendments to Rule 72(E) and (F), was a slightly different concern. The Special Court, as has
already been noted, is different from the ICTY and ICTR in many ways. One of those is
funding. “Due to general dissatisfaction with the cost and inefficiency of the [International
Criminal Tribunals, the Security Council] refused to support a further ad hoc tribunal and were
wary of accepting the responsibility of running the court.” 81 This has resulted in an expectation
that the Special Court will be of a more limited duration and will have fewer sources of funding.
In short, the Special Court must work faster with less funding. With this in mind, the Judges
decided that Rule 72 as inherited from the ICTR “did not adequately provide for disposal of
preliminary motions” and would have significantly, and unjustifiably, delayed the entire Court. 82
So for the Special Court, the intent in changing Rule 72 to allow interlocutory appeals was to
facilitate the completion of a discrete number of cases by pushing up to the Appeals Chamber all
the issues that would likely have to be decided there anyway, without wasting the time of the
Trial Chamber.
This balancing of the purpose of the new rule and whether it would be achieved with a
retroactive application, the element of surprise for those who relied on the old rule, and the effect
on the Special Court’s ability to carry out its mission of expeditious, effective and fair
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administration of justice would be one workable option in allowing the Special Court flexibility
in its procedures while still protecting the rights of the accused. The fact that this approach is
heavily rooted in the common law tradition 83 would pose little burden for the Special Court.
Sierra Leone, as a former British colony, inherited the common law system, as evidenced by the
Appeals Chamber’s quoting the Magna Carta’s guarantee of a timely justice in one Norman case
decision. 84 As has already been discussed, Article 14 of the SCSL Statute permits the judges to
be guided by Sierra Leonean law when amending the Rules. 85
3. No Perfect Solution
Even considering the factors discussed above that the Special Court could consider when
deciding whether it would be fair to retroactively apply an amended rule to a pending case, it is
impossible to create a judicial system that guarantees a defendant’s rights will be protected in all
situations. In the case of the Special Court, three important factors contribute to the dilemma:
(1) relatively few indictments, (2) the possibility of violence from the defendants’ supporters,
and (3) conflicting rights.
The Special Court was designed to quickly and efficiently try those individuals who bore
the largest responsibility for the suffering caused by Sierra Leone’s civil war. To that end,
between March and September 2003, thirteen individuals were indicted on a variety of charges
including international and domestic crimes. Of those thirteen, two have since died, resulting in
the withdrawal of their indictments, nine are currently detained, and two, Charles Taylor and
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Johnny Paul Koroma, are still at large. 86 In 2004, the Trial Chamber ordered joint trials for the
defendants based on their affiliations during the civil war. This resulted in three separate trials,
each with three defendants: the CDF, consisting of Samuel Hinga Norman, Allieu Kondewa and
Moinina Fofana; the RUF, consisting of Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao;
and the AFRC, consisting of Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor
Kanu. If Taylor or Koroma are ever detained, they will each be tried separately. Of those
currently in custody, their trials all began between June 2004 and March 2005. 87

The

consequence of this is that since all of the trials that are likely to occur have already begun, the
amended Rules would have to be applied retroactively to already pending cases if they are going
to apply to anyone at all. If they are not applied retroactively, the Special Court effectively will
not be able to address any of the unforeseen problems. This would clearly be contrary to the
intent of the Special Court Agreement and SCSL Statute’s framers when they included Article 14
in the founding statute.
One of the consequences of the defendants being grouped by their civil war affiliations is
the appearance of the groups being tried as a whole. It is important to keep two facts in mind.
First, as the leaders of the warring factions, it is probable that they still have supporters
throughout the country. Second, one of the main considerations in creating the Special Court
was the goal of promoting peace and national reconciliation.88

If one faction is treated

differently than the others, it is likely to promote a fear among their supporters that their faction
is being singled out, increasing the likelihood of a resurgence of violence. While the Special
Court’s purpose is strictly limited to those with the greatest responsibility for the civil war, and
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there is no legal grounds for expanding its scope to include all participants in the war short of the
U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone amending the Special Court Agreement, anyone fearful
that they may be on the “next” list of indictments is not likely to give those limitations much
credibility. The Lomé Peace Accord guaranteed Foday Sankoh amnesty, and yet he is currently
in custody and on trial. 89 This concern may motivate the judges to apply all amendments to as
many defendants as possible in order to maintain the appearance of impartiality, even if doing so
infringes to some extent on a defendant’s rights.
A final reason a perfect solution is not possible is that the rights that are guaranteed can
be in conflict with one another. A clear example of this was addressed by the Appeals Chamber
in Norman when it ruled that amending Rule 72 to allow interlocutory appeals was a legitimate
exercise of judicial discretion. The defense alleged that the right to a fair trial was being violated
by not being able to appeal a preliminary motion decided by the Appeals Chamber. The Special
Court responding by stressing the right to an expeditious trial. In the ICTR, which did not allow
appeals until after a person was convicted, the average time for a trial from the Prosecutor’s
opening statement to the Trial Chamber’s verdict, was 21.5 months. 90 The implication of this is
clear: a defendant’s rights may at times conflict, and when this happens the Special Court will
use its discretion in deciding which right has more weight in that given circumstance.
Given the impossibility of a perfect judicial system, it is likely that policy considerations,
rather than pure legal principles, will play some role in determining when to apply amended rules
retroactively. This situation has in the past, and almost certainly will in the future, resulted in the
Special Court having to choose between a strict adherence to the rights of the accused and the
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broad goals of the Special Court, peace and reconciliation. When this happens again, the Special
Court will likely come down on the side of peace and reconciliation.
IV. AD HOMINEM
Ad hominem is a logical fallacy where someone attacks another’s argument solely on the
grounds that there is something discreditable about the person making the argument. The
attacker suggests that his adversary’s conclusions are flawed because that person is somehow
flawed rather than addressing the facts or arguments set forth. Not all personal attacks are ad
hominem; there is a requirement that the intent of the personal attack is to discredit the person.
Also, not all ad hominem attacks are fallacious. When the attack is directed at the deduction or
conclusion another comes to, rather than the facts upon which it is made, it is fallacious.
However, when the personal attack is aimed at discrediting the facts or evidence used to come to
the conclusion, the attack could be a valid argument. 91 For example, in a debate between two
history professors, one dismisses the other’s conclusions about radical terrorism on the grounds
that the second professor is a Muslim. The first professor’s attack would be ad hominem because
it does not address the strengths of the second’s argument, but rather he implies that because of
his religion, his conclusions are biased and thus unreliable.
Because there is no Restatement of the Law regarding ad hominem attacks or no
customary international law banning them outright, this section will begin by examining what a
defendant would have to prove to demonstrate that his right to a fair trial has been violated by a
retroactive rule on the basis that the amendment was ad hominem. Then, the SCSL Statute will
be examined to determine what measures included to prevent such an abuse of discretion.
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Finally, the last section will analyze the likelihood of successfully challenging the retroactive
application of an amendment on the grounds that it is ad hominem.
A. Ad Hominem and Rights of the Accused
Like the issue of retroactivity of amendments to the Rules, there is no explicit right to be
free from an ad hominem attack. Instead, that right is implied by the widely accepted rights to a
fair hearing and to equal treatment before the courts. For a defendant to successfully make a
claim that these rights have been violated by an ad hominem attack, he would have to show first
that the amendment was effectively a personal attack against him with the intent to discredit his
deductions or conclusions, or in this case, the defendant’s legal defenses. Second, he would have
to show that the amendment, when applied retroactively to him, violated his rights either by
resulting in an unfair trial or by treating him differently than other defendants in a similar
situation.
The first element would be the hardest to prove. Based on the performance of the ICTY
and ICTR, the framers of the Special Court Agreement and the SCSL Statute created Special
Court on a different model from the earlier tribunals, 92 taking the lessons learned and building a
more efficient court. One of those lessons was that unforeseen problems would arise, potentially
violating the defendants’ rights if not addressed. Thus, Article 14 of the SCSL Statute adopts the
ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with the caveat that they may be amended where they
do not adequately represent the needs or concerns of the Special Court. 93 The difficulty this
presents a defendant is that he must show not only that there were no legitimate grounds for
amending the Rules, but also that the amendment was adopted with the specific intent of
discrediting that defendant.

While a defendant may be disadvantaged by a particular
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amendment, even one arising from a problem first encountered in his case, the Special Court is
unlikely to accept the argument that the amendment was intended to prejudice a defendant’s case
if there is a valid reason for changing the rule. The second element, on the other hand, would be
fairly easy to prove if the defendant could establish that there was a specific intent to undermine
his case. Such an intent would clearly demonstrate that defendant was being treated differently,
and unequally, than the other defendants, violating Article 17(1) of the SCSL Statute. This abuse
would certainly reach the threshold of undermining “the integrity of the proceedings” the Special
Court set in Brima. 94
B. Statutory Safeguards for the Rights of the Accused
In requesting the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement creating an independent
tribunal for Sierra Leone, the U.N. Security Council recognized that “a credible system of justice
and accountability for the very serious crimes committed there would end impunity and would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration of peace.” 95 With those
concerns in mind, the Special Court Agreement, SCSL Statute and Rules were drafted with the
intention of creating a court that was, and was perceived to be, expeditious, effective and
impartial. Provisions to ensure that the rights of the accused were protected were included in
each of the three above mentioned documents.
1. Impartial Judges
In discussing the Statute of the Iraq Special Tribunal, M. Cherif Bassiouni states that the
basis for the judges’ compensation should be fully articulated “to avoid the taint of preferential
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ad hominem determinations, which violate the principles of a judiciary's independence.” 96 At
the heart of his point is that the appearance of impropriety could undermine people’s faith in the
independence of the system and the impartiality of the judges, resulting in an unfair trial.
Alleging that a rule is amended as an ad hominem attack on a specific defendant implies that the
judges adopting the amendment have some bias or that there is a specific outcome of the trial
they desire. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the judges appointed to the Special Court
are impartial in order to maintain the court’s integrity.
Article 13 of the SCSL Statute requires that the judges appointed to the Special Court be
of “high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required . . .
for appointment to the highest judicial offices.” 97 Their independence was strengthened by two
facts. First, as an international body, the Special Court is outside of Sierra Leone’s judicial
system and is therefore unlikely to be influenced by the kinds of political pressures that domestic
politics can place on the judiciary. Second, as an entity created by treaty between the U.N. and
Sierra Leone, the Special Court is not a creation of the Security Council. Its hybrid nature,
combining international and Sierra Leonean laws and jurists, is designed to build confidence
within Sierra Leone, thus aiding in the “national reconciliation and restoration of peace.” The
inclusion of judges from outside of Sierra Leone provides a majority that is unlikely to have any
personal ties to the defendants or the victims of Sierra Leone’s civil war, and the Sierra Leonean
judges provide a counter to any criticism that the Special Court is simply the tool of foreign
powers.
2. Professionally Responsible Prosecutors
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Like judges, the Prosecutor is to be of high moral character, possess the highest level of
competence, and have extensive experience in criminal law. 98 Furthermore, the Rules enable the
Special Court to exercise its power of contempt to punish “any person who knowingly and
willfully interferes with its administration of justice.” 99
3. Officials Authorized to Propose Amendments
As discussed above, amendments to the Rules may be proposed by a Judge, the
Prosecutor, the Registrar, the Principal Defender, the Sierra Leone Bar Association, or any
person invited to do so by the President of the Special Court. While the judges are the only ones
with the authority to approve amendments, the Rules do provide the Principal Defender a voice
in how the Special Court’s procedures develop.
4. Judgments in Writing
A final important safeguard built into the SCSL Statute is that the Special Court’s
judgment is required to have a reasoned opinion in writing. 100 This does two things to protect
the defendant’s rights. It makes public the reasons why the court ruled the way it did, decreasing
the likelihood that any judgment is made arbitrarily. It also provides a record for appeal,
allowing a convicted defendant to challenge the legal reasoning of the Trial Chamber.
C. Challenges to Retroactive Amendments
Given the multiple layers of protections afforded by the SCSL Statute and the Rules, the
Special Court’s own motivations for wanting to maintain the image of impartiality, and the
capability of the Special Court to protect the rights of the accused even while applying an
amended rule to a pending case, it is very unlikely that a defendant could successfully argue that
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an amendment was contrary to his rights because it was directed ad hominem. Since neither the
SCSL Statute nor international law as it applies to the Special Court per se prohibit the
retroactive application of a new rule, the defendant would have to show a violation of a
fundamental right, such as the right to a fair trial or equal protection before the court. As
discussed above, this would require the defendant prove the amendment was intended to
discriminate against him. Finally, any violation of his rights, when balanced against the nature
and severity of act being prosecuted, would have to be so egregious that continuing to prosecute
the case would undermine the integrity of the Special Court.
V. CONCLUSION
A brief examination of the SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence makes it clear that, at
least in the abstract, retroactive application of amended rules to currently pending cases could
violate the rights of the accused. The important thing is to realize which rights are actually
affected and whether there are ways of minimizing the likelihood of a violation, or the damage
caused when one occurs. The two most important things to understand about the rights at stake
in the application of a Rule 6(D) amendment are the right to a fair trial and the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege. While the accused has a right to a fair trial, that does not automatically
prohibit changing the Rules in the middle of a case. If the new rule can be applied in a way that
balances the severity and nature of the crime charged against the harm that would be done by not
applying the new rule, the Special Court is likely to allow the retroactive application so long as
the violation of a defendant’s rights is not so egregious that it threatens the integrity of the
Special Court.
Threatening the integrity of the Special Court is a fairly difficult standard for a defendant
to prove, and while it may be legally sound, such a standard could threaten the overall goals of
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the Special Court. The appearance of unfairness may be as damaging to a lasting peace as actual
bias. In order to prevent this from happening, the Special Court should ensure that decisions on
when to retroactively apply an amended rule fully address: the purpose of the new rule and how
applying it accomplishes that purpose; to what extent the element of surprise has been taken into
account; and the effect the rule will have on the court’s administration. By clearly articulating
these considerations, the Special Court can help ensure that its decisions are not perceived as
arbitrary and capricious, or even worse, as specifically aimed at persecuting one group of
defendants.
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege prohibits punishing a person for acts that were
criminalized only after they were committed. Rule 6(D) does not violate this principle. The acts
for which the defendants have been charged are defined in the SCSL Statute, not the Rules, and
the Special Court has no authority to amend the SCSL Statute. Furthermore, all of the crimes the
Special Court was created to prosecute either were already well established crimes under treaty
and customary international law or belong to that small included group of violations of Sierra
Leone’s laws, also well established during the period the SCSL Statute covers.
A claim that a person’s human rights were violated based on an ad hominem argument is
likely to fail because of the difficulty in proving the amendment was intended as a personal
attack aimed at undermining that person’s legal arguments and because of the multiple layers of
protections built into the Special Court. The biggest difficulty would be in proving that the
Special Court specifically intended the new rule to damage the defendant’s case. A second
difficulty is the lack of standards for what constitutes an ad hominem argument and how they
should be applied to international law. The only way to make such an argument is by showing
the ad hominem attack violated some other, clearly defined, right.
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The purpose of the Special Court is much greater than just to try individuals for their
criminal acts. What is at stake is a sustainable peace and national reconciliation following a
decade-long civil war. In making its decisions, the Special Court is likely to be influenced by
more than just legal considerations. Issues of policy will likely have an impact. The two guiding
principles will remain the right to a fair trial, and the furtherance of peace and national
reconciliation in Sierra Leone.
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